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Abstract
The Jeffreys–Lindley paradox displays how the use of a p-value (or number
of standard deviations z) in a frequentist hypothesis test can lead to an inference
that is radically different from that of a Bayesian hypothesis test in the form
advocated by Harold Jeffreys in the 1930s and common today. The setting
is the test of a well-specified null hypothesis (such as the Standard Model
of elementary particle physics, possibly with “nuisance parameters”) versus a
composite alternative (such as the Standard Model plus a new force of nature of
unknown strength). The p-value, as well as the ratio of the likelihood under the
null hypothesis to the maximized likelihood under the alternative, can strongly
disfavor the null hypothesis, while the Bayesian posterior probability for the null
hypothesis can be arbitrarily large. The academic statistics literature contains
many impassioned comments on this paradox, yet there is no consensus either
on its relevance to scientific communication or on its correct resolution. The
paradox is quite relevant to frontier research in high energy physics. This paper
is an attempt to explain the situation to both physicists and statisticians, in
the hope that further progress can be made.
∗cousins@physics.ucla.edu
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2
1 Introduction
On July 4, 2012, the leaders of two huge collaborations (CMS and ATLAS) presented
their results at a joint seminar at the CERN laboratory, located on the French–
Swiss border outside Geneva. Each described the observation of a “new boson”
(a type of particle), suspected to be the long-sought Higgs boson (Incandela and
Gianotti, 2012). The statistical significances of the results were expressed in terms
of “σ”: carefully calculated p-values (not assuming normality) were mapped onto
the equivalent number of standard deviations in a one-tailed test of the mean of a
normal (i.e., Gaussian) distribution. ATLAS observed 5σ significance by combining
the two most powerful detection modes (different kinds of particles into which the
boson decayed) in 2012 data with full results from earlier data. With independent
data from a different apparatus, and only partially correlated analysis assumptions,
CMS observed 5σ significance in a similar combination, and when combining with
some other modes as CMS had planned for that data set, 4.9σ.
With ATLAS and CMS also measuring similar values for the rates of production
of the detected particles, the new boson was immediately interpreted as the most
anticipated and publicized discovery in high energy physics (HEP) since the Web
was born (also at CERN). Journalists went scurrying for explanations of the meaning
of “σ”, and why “high energy physicists require 5σ for a discovery”. Meanwhile,
some who knew about Bayesian hypothesis testing asked why high energy physicists
were using frequentist p-values rather than calculating the posterior belief in the
hypotheses.
In this paper, I describe some of the traditions for claiming discovery in HEP,
which have a decidedly frequentist flavor, drawing in a pragmatic way on both Fisher’s
ideas and the Neyman–Pearson (NP) approach, despite their disagreements over foun-
dations of statistical inference. Of course, some HEP practitioners have been aware
of the criticisms of this approach, having enjoyed interactions with some of the influ-
ential Bayesian statisticians (both subjective and objective in flavor) who attended
HEP workshops on statistics. These issues lead directly to a famous “paradox”, as
Lindley (1957) called it, when testing the hypothesis of a specific value θ0 of a pa-
rameter against a continuous set of alternatives θ. The different scaling of p-values
and Bayes factors with sample size, described by Jeffreys and emphasized by Lindley,
can lead the frequentist and the Bayesian to inconsistent strengths of inferences that
in some cases can even reverse the apparent inferences.
However, as described below, it is an understatement to say that the community
of Bayesian statisticians has not reached full agreement on what should replace p-
values in scientific communication. For example, two of the most prominent voices of
“objective” Bayesianism (J. Berger and J. Bernardo) advocate fundamentally different
approaches to hypothesis testing for scientific communication. Furthermore, views in
the Bayesian literature regarding the validity of models (in the social sciences for
example) are strikingly different than those common in HEP.
This paper describes today’s rather unsatisfactory situation. Progress in HEP
meanwhile continues, but it would be potentially quite useful if more statisticians
become aware of the special circumstances in HEP, and reflect on what the Jeffreys–
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Lindley (JL) paradox means to HEP, and vice versa.
In “high energy physics”, also known as “elementary particle physics”, the objects
of study are the smallest building blocks of matter and the forces among them. (For
one perspective, see Wilczek (2004).) The experimental techniques often make use of
the highest-energy accelerated beams attainable. But due to the magic of quantum
mechanics, it is possible to probe much higher energy scales through precise mea-
surements of certain particle decays at lower energy; and since the early universe
was hotter than our most energetic beams, and still has powerful cosmic accelerators
and extreme conditions, astronomical observations are another crucial source of in-
formation on “high energy physics”. Historically, many discoveries in HEP have been
in the category known to statisticians as “the interocular traumatic test; you know
what the data mean when the conclusion hits you between the eyes.” (Edwards et al,
1963, p. 217, citing J. Berkson). In other cases, evidence accumulated slowly, and it
was considered essential to quantify evidence in a fashion that relates directly to the
subject of this review.
A wide range of views on the JL paradox can be found in reviews with com-
mentary by many distinguished statisticians, in particular those of Shafer (1982),
Berger and Sellke (1987), Berger and Delampady (1987a), and Robert, Chopin, and
Rousseau (2009). The review of Bayes factors by Kass and Raftery (1995) and the
earlier book by economist Leamer (1978) also offer interesting insights. Some of these
authors view statistical issues in their typical data analyses rather differently than
do physicists in HEP; perhaps the greatest contrast is that physicists do often have
non-negligible belief that their null hypotheses are valid to a precision much greater
than our measurement capability. Regarding the search by ATLAS and CMS that
led to the discovery of “a Higgs boson”, statistician van Dyk (2014) has prepared an
informative summary of the statistical procedures that were used.
In Sections 2–4, I review the paradox, discuss the concept of the point null hy-
pothesis, and observe that the paradox arises if there are three different scales in θ
having a hierarchy that is common in HEP. In Section 5, I address the notions com-
mon among statisticians that “all models are wrong”, and that scientists tend to be
biased against the null hypothesis, so that the paradox is irrelevant. I also describe
the likelihood-ratio commonly used in HEP as the test statistic. In Section 6, I discuss
the difficult issue of choosing the prior for θ, and in particular the scale τ of those
values of θ for which there is non-negligible prior belief. Section 7 briefly describes
the completely different approach to hypothesis testing advocated by Bernardo, which
stands apart from the bulk of the Bayesian literature. In Section 8, I discuss how
measured values and confidence intervals, for quantities such as production and decay
rates, augment the quoted p-value, and how small but precisely measured effects can
provide a window into very high energy physics. Section 9 discusses the choice of Type
I error α (probability of rejecting H0 when it is true) when adopting the approach
of NP hypothesis testing, with some comments on the “5σ myth” of HEP. Finally,
in Section 10, I discuss the seemingly universal agreement that a single p-value is (at
best) a woefully incomplete summary of the data, and how confidence intervals at
various confidence levels help readers assess the experimental results. I summarize
and conclude in Section 11.
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As it is useful to use precisely defined terms, we must be aware that statisticians
and physicists (and psychologists, etc.) have different naming conventions. For ex-
ample, a physicist says “measured value”, while a statistician says “point estimate”
(and while a psychologist says “effect size in original units”). This paper uses pri-
marily the language of statisticians, unless otherwise stated. Thus “estimation” does
not mean “guessing”, but rather the calculation of “point estimates” and “interval
estimates”. The latter refers to frequentist confidence intervals or their analogs in
other paradigms, known to physicists as “uncertainties on the measured values”. In
this paper, “error” is generally used in the precisely defined sense of Type I and
Type II errors of Neyman-Pearson theory (Section 9), unless obvious from context.
Other terms are defined in context below. Citations are provided for the benefit
of readers who may not be aware that certain terms (such as “loss”) have specific
technical meanings in the statistics literature. “Effect size” is commonly used in the
psychology literature, with at least two meanings. The first meaning, described by
the field’s publication manual (APA, 2010, p. 34) as “most often easily understood”,
is simply the measured value of a quantity in the original (often dimensionful) units.
Alternatively, a “standardized” dimensionless effect size is obtained by dividing by a
scale such as a standard deviation. In this paper, the term always refers to the former
definition (original units), corresponding to the physicist’s usual measured value of
a parameter or physical quantity. Finally, the word “model” in statistics literature
usually refers to a probabilistic equation that describes the assumed data-generating
mechanisms (Poisson, binomial, etc.), often with adjustable parameters. The use of
“model” for a “law of nature” is discussed below.
2 The original “paradox” of Lindley, as corrected
by Bartlett
Lindley (1957), with a crucial correction by Bartlett (1957), lays out the paradox in
a form that is useful as our starting point. This exposition also draws on Section
5.0 of Jeffreys (1961) and on Berger and Delampady (1987a). It mostly follows the
notation of the latter, with the convention of upper case for the random variable and
lower case for observed values. Figure 1 serves to illustrate various quantities defined
below.
Suppose X having density f(x|θ) is sampled, where θ is an unknown element of
the parameter space Θ. It is desired to test H0: θ = θ0 versus H1: θ 6= θ0. Following
the Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing pioneered by Jeffreys (also referred to
as Bayesian model selection), we assign prior probabilities pi0 and pi1 = 1− pi0 to the
respective hypotheses. Conditional on H1 being true, one also has a continuous prior
probability density g(θ) for the unknown parameter.
As discussed in the following sections, formulating the problem in this manner
leads to a conceptual issue, since in the continuous parameter space Θ, a single point
θ0 (set of measure zero) has non-zero probability associated with it. This is impossible
with a usual probability density, for which the probability assigned to an interval tends
5
Figure 1: Illustration of quantities used to define the JL paradox. The unknown
parameter is θ, with likelihood function L(θ) resulting from a measurement with
uncertainty σtot. The point MLE is θˆ, which in the sketch is about 5σtot away from the
null hypothesis, the “point null” θ0. The point null hypothesis has prior probability
pi0, which can be spread out over a small interval of width 0 without materially
affecting the paradox. The width of the prior pdf g(θ) under H1 has scale τ . The
scales have the hierarchy 0  σtot  τ .
to zero as the width of the interval tends to zero. Assignment of non-zero probability
pi0 to a single point θ0 is familiar to physicists by using the Dirac δ-function (times
pi0) at θ0, while statisticians often refer to placing “probability mass” at θ0, or to
using “counting measure” for θ0 (in distinction to “Lebesgue measure” for the usual
density g for θ 6= θ0). The null hypothesis corresponding to the single point θ0 is
also commonly referred to as a “point null” hypothesis, or as a “sharp hypothesis”.
As discussed below, just as a δ-function can be viewed as useful approximation to
a highly peaked function, for hypotheses in HEP it is often the case that the point
null hypothesis is a useful approximation to a prior that is sufficiently concentrated
around θ0.
If the density f(x|θ) under H1 is normal with mean θ and known variance σ2,
then for a random sample {x1, x2, . . . xn}, the sample mean is normal with variance
σ2/n, i.e., X has density N(θ, σ2/n). For conciseness (and eventually to make the
point that “n” can be obscure), let
σtot ≡ σ/
√
n. (1)
The likelihood is then
L(θ) = 1√
2piσtot
exp
{−(x− θ)2/2σ2tot} , (2)
with maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) θˆ = x. By Bayes’s Theorem, the posterior
probabilities of the hypotheses, given θˆ, are:
P (H0|θˆ) = 1
A
pi0 L(θ0) = 1
A
pi0
1√
2piσtot
exp
{
−(θˆ − θ0)2/2σ2tot
}
(3)
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and
P (H1|θˆ) = 1
A
pi1
∫
g(θ)L(θ)dθ = 1
A
pi1
∫
g(θ)
1√
2piσtot
exp
{
−(θˆ − θ)2/2σ2tot
}
dθ.
(4)
Here A is a normalization constant to make the sum of the two probabilities equal
unity, and the integral is over the support of the prior g(θ).
There will typically be a scale τ that indicates the range of values of θ over which
g(θ) is relatively large. One considers the case
σtot  τ, (5)
so that g(θ) varies slowly where the rest of the integrand is non-negligible, and there-
fore the integral approximately equals g(θˆ), so that
P (H1|θˆ) ≈ 1
A
pi1 g(θˆ) (6)
Then the ratio of posterior odds to prior odds for H0, i.e., the Bayes factor (BF), is
independent of A and pi0, and given by
BF ≡ P (H0|θˆ)
P (H1|θˆ)
/
pi0
pi1
≈ 1√
2piσtotg(θˆ)
exp
{
−(θˆ − θ0)2/2σ2tot
}
=
1√
2piσtotg(θˆ)
exp(−z2/2), (7)
where
z = (θˆ − θ0)/σtot =
√
n(θˆ − θ0)/σ (8)
is the usual statistic providing the departure from the null hypothesis in units of σtot.
Some authors (e.g., Kass and Raftery (1995)) use the notation B01 for this Bayes
factor, to make clear which hypotheses are used in the ratio; as this paper always
uses the same ratio, the subscripts are suppressed. Then the p-value for the two-
tailed test is p = 2(1−Φ(z)), where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. (As discussed in Section 5.2, in HEP often θ is physically non-negative, and
hence a one-tailed test is used, i.e., p = 1− Φ(z).)
Jeffreys (1961, p. 248) notes that g(θˆ) is independent of n and σtot goes as 1/
√
n,
and therefore a given cutoff value of BF does not correspond to a fixed value of z.
This discrepancy in the sample-size scaling of z and p-values compared to that of
Bayes factors (already noted for a constant g on p. 194 in his first edition of 1939) is
at the core of the JL paradox, even if one does not take values of n so extreme as to
make P (H0|θˆ) > P (H1|θˆ).
Jeffreys (1961, Appendix B, p. 435) curiously downplays the discrepancy at the
end of a sentence that summarizes his objections to testing based on p-values (almost
verbatim with p. 360 of his 1939 edition): “In spite of the difference in principle
between my tests and those based on [p-values], and the omission of the latter to give
the increase in the critical values for large n, dictated essentially by the fact that in
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testing a small departure found from a large number of observations we are selecting
a value out of a long range and should allow for selection, it appears that there is not
much difference in the practical recommendations.” He does say, “At large numbers
of observations there is a difference”, but he suggests that this will be rare and that
the test might not be properly formulated: “internal correlation should be suspected
and tested”.
In contrast, Lindley (1957) emphasized how large the discrepancy could be, using
the example where g(θ) is taken to be constant over an interval that contains both θˆ
and the range of θ in which the integrand is non-negligible. For any arbitrarily small
p-value (arbitrarily large z) that is traditionally interpreted as evidence against the
null hypothesis, there will always exist n for which the BF can be arbitrarily large in
favor of the null hypothesis.
Bartlett (1957) quickly noted that Lindley had neglected the length of the interval
over which g(θ) is constant, which should appear in the numerator of the BF, and
which makes the posterior probability of H0 “much more arbitrary”. More generally,
the normalization of g always has a scale τ that characterizes the extent in θ for which
g is non-negligible, which implies that g(θˆ) ∝ 1/τ . Thus, there is a factor of τ in the
numerator of BF. For example, Berger and Delampady (1987a) and others consider
g(θ) having density N(θ0, τ
2), which, in the limit of Eqn. 5, leads to
BF =
τ
σtot
exp(−z2/2). (9)
There is the same proportionality in the Lindley/Bartlett example if the length of
their interval is τ . The crucial point is the generic scaling,
BF ∝ τ
σtot
exp(−z2/2). (10)
Of course, the value of the proportionality constant depends on the form of g and
specifically on g(θˆ).
Meanwhile, from Eqn. 2, the ratio λ of the likelihood of θ0 under H0 and the
maximum likelihood under H1 is
λ = L(θ0)/L(θˆ) (11)
= exp
{
(θˆ − θ0)2/2σ2tot
}/
exp
{
(θˆ − θˆ)2/2σ2tot
}
(12)
= exp(−z2/2) (13)
∝
(σtot
τ
)
BF. (14)
Thus, unlike the case of simple-vs-simple hypotheses discussed below in Section 2.2,
this maximum likelihood ratio takes the side of the p-value in disfavoring the null
hypothesis for large z, independent of σtot/τ , and thus independent of sample size
n. This difference between maximizing L(θ) under H1, and averaging it under H1
weighted by the prior g(θ), can be dramatic.
The factor σtot/τ (arising from the average of L weighted by g in Eqn. 4) is
often called the “Ockham factor” that provides a desirable “Ockham’s razor” effect
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(Jaynes, 2003, Chapter 20) by penalizing H1 for imprecise specification of θ. But
the fact that (even asymptotically) BF depends directly on the scale τ of the prior
g(θ) (and more precisely on g(θˆ)) can come as a surprise to those deeply steeped in
Bayesian point and interval estimation, where typically the dependence on all priors
diminishes asymptotically. The surprise is perhaps enhanced since the BF is often
introduced as the factor by which prior odds (even if subjective) are modified in light
of the observed data, giving the initial impression that the subjective part is factorized
out from the BF.
The likelihood ratio λ = exp(−z2/2) takes on the numerical values 0.61, 0.14,
0.011, 0.00034, and 3.7E-06, as z is equal to 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Thus, in
order for the Ockham factor to reverse the preferences of the hypotheses in the BF
compared to the maximum likelihood ratio λ, the Ockham factor must be smaller
than these numbers in the respective cases. Some examples of σtot and τ in HEP
that can do this (at least up to z = 4) are in Section 5.1. As discussed below, even
when not in the extreme case where the Ockham factor reverses the preference of the
hypotheses, its effect deserves scrutiny.
From the derivation, the origin of the Ockham factor (and hence sample-size
dependence) does not depend on the chosen value of pi0, and thus not on the commonly
suggested choice of pi0 = 1/2. The scaling in Eqn. 10 follows from assigning any
non-zero probability to the single point θ = θ0, as described above using the Dirac
δ-function, or “probability mass”.
The situation clearly invited further studies, and various authors, beginning with
Edwards et al (1963), have explored the impact of changing g(θ), making numerical
comparisons of p-values to Bayes factors in contexts such as testing a point null
hypothesis for a binomial parameter. Generally they have given examples in which
the p-value is always numerically smaller than the BF, even when the prior for θ
“gives the utmost generosity to the alternative hypothesis”.
2.1 Is there really a “paradox”?
A trivial “resolution” of JL paradox is to point out that there is no reason to expect
the numerical results of frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing to agree, as they
calculate different quantities. Still, it is unnerving to many that “hypothesis tests”
that are both communicating scientific results for the same data can have such a large
discrepancy. So is it a paradox?
I prefer to use the word “paradox” with the meaning I recall from school, “a state-
ment that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps
true” (Webster, 1969, definition 2a). This is the meaning of the word, for example, in
the celebrated “paradoxes” of Special Relativity, such as the Twin Paradox and the
Pole-in-Barn Paradox. The “resolution” of a paradox is then a careful explanation of
why it is not a contradiction. I therefore do not use the word paradox as a synonym
for contradiction—that takes a word with (I think) a very useful meaning and wastes
it on a redundant meaning of another word. It can however be confusing that what
is deemed paradoxical depends on the personal perspective of what is “seemingly”
contradictory. If someone says, “What Lindley called a paradox is not a paradox”,
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then typically they either define paradox as a synonym for contradiction, or it was
always so obvious to them that the paradox is not a contradiction that they think
it is not paradoxical. (It could also be that there is a contradiction that cannot be
resolved, but I have not seen that used as an argument for why it is not a paradox.)
Although it may still be questionable as to whether there is a resolution satisfactory
to everyone, for now I think that the word paradox is quite apt. As the deep issue is
the scaling of the BF with sample size (for fixed p-value) as pointed out by Jeffreys
already in 1939, I follow some others in calling it the Jeffreys–Lindley (JL) paradox.
Other ambiguities in discussions regarding the JL paradox include whether the
focus is on the posterior odds of H0 (which includes the prior odds) or on the BF
(which does not). In addition, while one often introduces the paradox by noting the
extreme cases where the p-value and the BF seem to imply opposite inferences, one
should also emphasize the less dramatic (but still disturbing) cases where the Ockham
factor plays a large (and potentially) arbitrary role, even if the BF favors H1. In the
latter cases, it can be claimed that the p-value overstates the evidence against H0. In
this paper I focus on the BF, following some others, e.g. Edwards et al (1963, who
somewhat confusingly denote it by L, p. 218) and Bernardo (1999, p. 102). I also
take a rather inclusive view of the paradox, as the issue of differences in sample size
scaling is always present, even if not taken to the extreme limit where the Ockham
factor overwhelms the BF, and even reverses arbitrarily small prior probability for
H0.
2.2 The JL paradox is not about testing simple H0 vs simple
H1
Testing simple H0: θ = θ0 vs simple H1: θ = θ1 provides another interesting contrast
between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing, but this is not an example of the
JL paradox. The Bayes factor and the likelihood ratio are the same (in the absence
of nuisance parameters), and therefore in agreement as to which hypothesis the data
favor. This is in contrast to the high-n limit of the JL paradox,
In the situation of the JL paradox, there is a value of θ under H1 that is equal
to the MLE θˆ, and which consequently has a likelihood no lower than that of θ0.
The extent to which θˆ is not favored by the prior is encoded in the Ockham factor of
Eqn. 14, which means that the BF and the likelihood ratio λ can disagree on both
the magnitude and even the direction of the evidence.
Simple-vs-simple hypothesis tests are far less common in HEP than simple-vs-
composite tests, but have arisen as the CERN experiments have been attempting to
infer properties of the new boson, such as the quantum numbers that characterize
its spin and parity. Again supposing X having density f(x|θ) is sampled, now one
can form two well-defined p-values, namely p0 indicating departures from H0 in the
direction of H1, and p1 indicating departures from H1 in the direction of H0. A
physicist will examine both p-values in making an inference.
Thompson (2007, p. 108) argues that the set of the two p-values is “the evidence”,
and many in HEP may agree. Certainly neglecting one of the p-values can be dan-
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gerous. For example, if θ0 < θˆ < θ1, and σtot  θ1−θ0, then it is conceivable that H0
is rejected at 5σ, while if H1 were the null hypothesis, it would be rejected at 7σ. A
physicist would be well aware of this circumstance and hardly fall into the straw-man
trap of implicitly accepting H1 by focusing only on p0 and “rejecting” (only) H0. The
natural reaction would be to question both hypotheses; i.e., the two-simple-hypothesis
model would be questioned. (In this context, Senn (2001, pp. 200-201) has further
criticism and references regarding the issue of sample-size dependence of p-values.)
3 Do point null hypotheses make sense in princi-
ple, or in practice?
In the Bayesian literature, there are notably differing attitudes expressed regarding
the relevance of a point null hypothesis θ = θ0. Starting with Jeffreys, the fact
that Bayesian hypothesis testing can treat a point null hypothesis in a special way
is considered by many proponents to be an advantage. (As discussed in Section 9,
frequentist testing of a point null vs a composite alternative is tied to interval esti-
mation, a completely different approach.) The hypothesis test is often phrased in the
language of model selection: the “smaller” model H0 is nested in the “larger” model
H1. From this point of view, it seems natural to have one’s prior probabilities pi0
and pi1 for the two models. However, as mentioned above, from the point of view of
putting a prior on the entire space Θ in the larger model, this corresponds to a non-
regular prior that has counting measure (δ-function to physicists) on θ0 and Lebesgue
measure (usual probability density to physicists) on θ 6= θ0.
As discussed by Casella and Berger (1987a), some of the more disturbing aspects
of the JL paradox are ameliorated (or even “reconciled”) if there is no point null,
and the test is the so-called “one-sided test”, namely H0: θ ≤ θ0 vs H1: θ > θ0.
Given the importance of the issue of probability assigned to the point null, some of
the opinions expressed in the statistics literature are highlighted below, to contrast
with the attitude in HEP described in Section 5.
Lindley (2009) lauds the “triumph” of Jeffreys’s “general method of significance
tests, putting a concentration of prior probability on the null—no ignorance here—
and evaluating the posterior probability using what we now call Bayes factors.” As a
strong advocate of the use of subjective priors that represent personal belief, Lindley
views the probability mass on the point null as subjective. (In the same comment,
Lindley criticizes Jeffrey’s “error” of integrating over the sample space of unobserved
data in formulating his eponymous priors for use in point and interval estimation.)
At the other end of the spectrum of Bayesian theorists, Bernardo (2009) comments
on Robert et al (2009): “Jeffreys intends to obtain a posterior probability for a precise
null hypothesis, and, to do this, he is forced to use a mixed prior which puts a lump
of probability p = Pr(H0) on the null, say H0 ≡ θ = θ0 and distributes the rest
with a proper prior p(θ) (he mostly chooses p = 1/2). This has a very upsetting
consequence, usually known as Lindley’s paradox: for any fixed prior probability p
independent of the sample size n, the procedure will wrongly accept H0 whenever the
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likelihood is concentrated around a true parameter value which lies O(n−1/2) from H0.
I find it difficult to accept a procedure which is known to produce the wrong answer
under specific, but not controllable, circumstances.” When pressed by commenters,
Bernardo (2011b) says that “I am sure that there are situations where the scientist
is willing to use a prior distribution highly concentrated at a particular region and
explore the consequences of this assumption. . . What I claim is that, even in precise
hypothesis testing situations, the scientist is often interested in an analysis which does
not assume this type of sharp prior knowledge. . . .” Bernardo goes on to advocate a
different approach (Section 7), which “has the nontrivial merit of being able to use
for both estimation and hypothesis testing problems a single, unified theory for the
derivation of objective ‘reference’ priors.”
Some statisticians find point null hypotheses irrelevant to their own work. In the
context of an unenthusiastic comment on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
Gelman and Rubin (1995) say “More generally, realistic prior distributions in social
science do not have a mass of probability at zero. . . .” Raftery (1995b) disagrees,
saying that “social scientists are prepared to act as if they had prior distributions
with point masses at zero. . . social scientists often entertain the possibility that an
effect is small ”.
In the commentary of Bernardo (2011b), C. Robert and J. Rousseau say, “Down
with point masses! The requirement that one uses a point mass as a prior when
testing for point null hypotheses is always an embarrassment and often a cause of
misunderstanding in our classrooms. Rephrasing the decision to pick the simpler
model as the result of a larger advantage is thus much more likely to convince our
students. What matters in pointwise hypothesis testing is not whether or not θ = θ0
holds but what the consequences of a wrong decision are.”
Some comments on the point null hypothesis are related to another claim, that
all models and all point nulls are at best approximations that are wrong at some
level. I discuss this point in more detail in Section 5, but include a few quotes here.
Edwards et al (1963) say, “. . . in typical applications, one of the hypotheses—the null
hypothesis—is known by all concerned to be false from the outset,” citing others
including Berkson (1938). Vardeman (1987) claims, “Competent scientists do not
believe their own models or theories, but rather treat them as convenient fictions. A
small (or even 0) prior probability that the current theory is true is not just a device
to make posterior probabilities as small as p values, it is the way good scientists
think!”
Casella and Berger (1987b) object specifically to Jeffreys’s use of pi0 = pi1 = 1/2,
used in modern papers as well: “Most researchers would not put 50% prior proba-
bility on H0. The purpose of an experiment is often to disprove H0 and researchers
are not performing experiments that they believe, a priori, will fail half the time!”
Kadane (1987) expresses a similar sentiment: “For the last 15 years or so I have been
looking seriously for special cases in which I might have some serious belief in a null
hypothesis. I have found only one [testing astrologer]. . . I do not expect to test a
precise hypothesis as a serious statistical calculation.”
As discussed below, such statisticians have evidently not been socializing with
many HEP physicists. In fact, in the literature I consulted, I encountered very few
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statisticians who granted, as did Zellner (2009), that physical laws such as E =
mc2 are point hypotheses, and “Many other examples of sharp or precise hypotheses
can be given and it is incorrect to exclude such hypotheses a priori or term them
‘unrealistic’. . . .”
Condensed matter physicist and Nobel Laureate Philip Anderson (1992) argued
for Jeffreys-style hypothesis testing with respect to a claim for evidence for a fifth
force of nature. “Let us take the ‘fifth force’. If we assume from the outset that there
is a fifth force, and we need only measure its magnitude, we are assigning the bin with
zero range and zero magnitude an infinitesimal probability to begin with. Actually,
we should be assigning this bin, which is the null hypothesis we want to test, some
finite a priori probability—like 1/2—and sharing out the remaining 1/2 among all
the other strengths and ranges.”
Already in Edwards et al (1963, p. 235) there was a key point related to the
situation in HEP: “Bayesians. . . must remember that the null hypothesis is a hazily
defined small region rather than a point.” They also emphasized the subjective nature
of singling out a point null hypothesis: “At least for Bayesian statisticians, however,
no procedure for testing a sharp null hypothesis is likely to be appropriate unless the
null hypothesis deserves special initial credence.”
That the “point” null can really be a “hazily defined small region” is clear from
the derivation in Section 2. The general scaling conclusion of Eqn. 10 remains valid
if “hazily defined small region” means that the region of θ included in H0 has a scale
0 such that 0  σtot. To a physicist, this just means that computing integrals
using a δ-function is a good approximation to integrating over a finite region in θ.
(Some authors, such as Berger and Delampady (1987a) have explored quantitatively
the approximation induced in the BF by non-zero 0.)
4 Three scales for θ yield a paradox
From the preceding sections, we can conclude that for the JL paradox to arise, it is
sufficient that there exist three scales in the parameter space Θ, namely:
1. 0, the scale under H0;
2. σtot, the scale for the total measurement uncertainty; and
3. τ , the scale under H1;
and that they have the hierarchy
0  σtot  τ. (15)
This situation is common in frontier experiments in HEP, where, as discussed in
Section 5.1, the three scales are often largely independent. We even have cases where
0 = 0, i.e., most of the subjective prior probability is on θ = 0. This is the case if θ
is the mass of the photon.
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As noted for example by Shafer (1982), the source of the precision of σtot does
not matter as long as condition in Eqn. 15 is satisfied. The statistics literature tends
to focus on the case where σtot arises from a sample size n via Eqn. 1. This invites
the question as to whether n can really be arbitrarily large in order to make σtot
arbitrarily small. In my view the existence of a regime where the BF goes as τ/σtot
for fixed z (as in Eqn. 10) is the fundamental characteristic that can lead to the JL
paradox, even if this regime does not extend to σtot → 0. As I discuss in Section 5.1,
such regimes are present in HEP analyses, and there is not always a well-defined n
underlying σtot, a point I return to in Sections 5.2 and 6 below in discussing τ . But
we first consider the model itself.
5 HEP and belief in the null hypothesis
At the heart of the measurement models in HEP are well-established equations that
are commonly known as “laws of nature”. By some historical quirks, the current
“laws” of elementary particle physics, which have survived several decades of in-
tense scrutiny with only a few well-specified modifications, are collectively called a
“model”, namely the Standard Model (SM). In this review, I refer to the equations of
such “laws”, or alternatives considered as potential replacements for them, as “core
physics models”. The currently accepted core physics models have parameters, such
as masses of the quarks and leptons, which with few exceptions have all been measured
reasonably precisely (even if requiring care to define).
Multiple complications arise in going from the core physics model to the full mea-
surement model that describes the probability densities for observations such as the
momentum spectra of particles emerging from proton-proton collisions. Theoretical
calculations based on the core physics model can be quite complex, requiring, for
example, approximations due to truncation of power series, incomplete understand-
ing of the internal structure of colliding protons, and insufficient understanding of
the manner in which quarks emerging from the collision recombine into sprays of
particles (“jets”) that can be detected. The results of such calculations, with their
attendant uncertainties, must then be propagated through simulations of the response
of detectors that are parametrized using many calibration constants, adjustments for
inefficient detection, misidentification of particles, etc. Much of the work in data
analysis in HEP involves subsidiary analyses to measure and calibrate detector re-
sponses, to check the validity of theoretical predictions to describe data (especially
where no departures are expected), and to confirm the accuracy of many aspects of
the simulations.
The aphorism “all models are wrong” (Box, 1976) can certainly apply to the detec-
tor simulation, where common assumptions of normal or log-normal parametrizations
are, at best, only good approximations. But the pure core physics models still exist
as testable hypotheses that may be regarded as point null hypotheses. Alternatives to
the SM are more generalized models in which the SM is nested. It is certainly worth
trying to understand if some physical parameter in the alternative core physics model
is zero (corresponding to the SM), even if it is necessary to do so through the smoke
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of imperfect detector descriptions with many uninteresting and imperfectly known
nuisance parameters. Indeed much of what distinguishes the capabilities of experi-
menters is how well they can do precisely that by determining the detector response
through careful calibration and cross-checks. This distinction is over-looked in the
contention (Berger and Delampady, 1987a, p. 320) that a point null hypothesis in a
core physics model cannot be precisely tested if the rest of the measurement model
is not specified perfectly.
There is a deeper point to be made about core physics models concerning the dif-
ference between a model being a good “approximation” in the ordinary sense of the
word, and the concept of a mathematical limit. The equations of Newtonian physics
have been superseded by those of special and general relativity, but the earlier equa-
tions are not just approximations that did a good job in predicting (most) planetary
orbits; they are the correct mathematical limits in a precise sense. The kinematic
expressions for momentum, kinetic energy, etc., are the limits of the special relativity
equations in the limit as the speed goes to zero. That is, if you specify a maximum
tolerance for error due to the approximation of Newtonian mechanics, then there ex-
ists a speed below which it will always be correct within that tolerance. Similarly,
Newton’s universal law of gravity is the correct mathematical limit of General Rela-
tivity in the limit of small gravitational fields and low speeds (conditions that were
famously not satisfied to observational precision for the orbit of the planet Mercury).
This limiting behavior can often be viewed through an appropriate power series.
For example, we can expand the expression for kinetic energy T from special relativity,
T =
√
p2 +m2−m, in powers of p2/m2 in the non-relativistic limit where momentum
p is much smaller than the mass m. The Newtonian expression, T = p2/2m, is the first
term in the series, followed by the lowest order relativistic correction term of p4/8m3.
(I use the usual HEP units in which the speed of light c is 1 and dimensionless; to
use other units, substitute pc for p, and mc2 for m.)
An analogous, deeper concept arises in the context of effective field theories. An
effective field theory in a sense consists of the correct first term(s) in a power series
of inverse powers of some scale that is much higher than the applicable scale of the
effective theory (Georgi, 1993). When a theory is expressed as an infinite series, a key
issue is whether there is a finite number of coefficients to be determined experimen-
tally, from which all other coefficients can be (at least in principle) calculated, with
no unphysical answers (in particular infinity) appearing for measurable quantities.
Theories having this property are called renormalizable, and are naturally greatly
favored over theories that give infinities for measurable quantities or that require
in effect an infinite number of adjustable parameters. It was a major milestone in
HEP theory when it was shown that the SM (including its Higgs boson) is in a class
of renormalizable theories (’t Hooft, 1999); removing the Higgs boson destroys this
property.
In the last three or four decades, thousands of measurements have tested the
consistency of the predictions of the SM, many with remarkable precision, including
of course measurements at the LHC. Nonetheless, the SM is widely believed to be
incomplete, as it leaves unanswered some obvious questions (such as why there are
three generations of quarks and leptons, and why their masses have the values they
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do). If the goal of a unified theory of forces is to succeed, the current mathematical
formulation will become embedded into a larger mathematical structure, such that
more forces and quanta will have to be added. Indeed much of the current theoretical
and experimental research program is aimed at uncovering these extensions, while a
significant effort is also spent on understanding further the consequences of the known
relationships. Nevertheless, whatever new physics is added, we also expect that the
SM will remain a correct mathematical limit, or a correct effective field theory, within
a more inclusive theory. It is in this sense of being the correct limit or correct effective
field theory that physicists believe that the SM is “true”, both in its parts and in
the collective whole. (I am aware that there are deep philosophical questions about
reality, and that this point of view can be considered “naive”, but this is a point of
view that is common among high energy physicists.)
It may be that on deeper inspection the distinction between an ordinary “approx-
imation” and a mathematical limit will not be so great, as even crude approximations
might be considered as types of limits. Also, the usefulness of power series breaks
down in certain important “non-perturbative” regimes. Nonetheless, the concepts of
renormalizability, limits, and effective field theories are helpful in clarifying what is
meant by belief in core physics models. Comparing the approach of many physicists
to that of statisticians working in other fields, an important distinction appears to
be the absence of core “laws” in their models. Under such circumstances, one would
naturally be averse to obsession about exact values of model parameters when the
uncertainty in the model itself is already dominant.
5.1 Examples of three scales for θ in HEP experiments
Many searches at the frontier of HEP have three scales with the hierarchy in Eqn. 15.
An example is an experiment in the 1980s that searched for a particular decay of
a particle called the long-lived neutral kaon, the K0L. This decay, to a muon and
electron, had been previously credibly ruled out for a branching fraction (probability
per kaon decay) of 10−8 or higher. With newer technology and better beams, the
proposal was to search down to a level of 10−12. This decay was forbidden at this
level in the SM, but there was a possibility that the decay occurred at the 10−17 level
(Barroso et al, 1984) or lower via a process where neutrinos change type within an
expanded version of the SM; since this latter process was out of reach, it was included
in the “point null” hypothesis. This search was therefore a “fishing expedition” for
“physics beyond the Standard Model” (BSM physics), in this case a new force of
nature with σtot ≈ 10−12 and 0 ≈ 10−17. Both the scale τ of prior belief and g(θ)
would be hard to define, as the motivation for performing the experiment was the
capability to explore the unknown with the potential for a major discovery of a new
force. For me personally, pi1 was small (say 1%), and the scale τ was probably close
to that of the range being explored, 10−8. (The first incarnation of the experiment
reached σtot ≈ 10−11, without evidence for a new force (Arisaka et al, 1993)). As
discussed in Section 8.2, searches for such rare decays are typically interpreted in
terms of the influence of possible new particles with very high masses, higher than
can be directly produced.
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As another example, perhaps the most extreme, it is of great interest to determine
whether or not protons decay, i.e., whether or not the decay rate is exactly zero, as
so far seems to be the case experimentally. Experiments have already probed values
of the average decay rate per proton of 1 decay per 1031 to 1033 years. This is part
of the range of values predicted by certain unified field theories that extend the SM
(Wilczek, 2004). As the age of the universe is order 1010 years, these are indeed very
small rates. Thanks to the exponential nature of such decays in quantum mechanics,
the search for such tiny decay rates is possible by observing nearly 1034 protons (many
kilotons of water) for several years, rather than by observing several protons for 1034
years! Assigning the three scales is rather arbitrary, but I would say that σtot ≈ 10−32
and τ initially was perhaps 10−28. Historically the null hypothesis under the SM was
considered to be a point exactly at zero decay rate, until 1976 when ’t Hooft (1976)
pointed out an exotic non-perturbative mechanism for proton decay. But his formula
for the SM rate has a factor of about exp(−137pi) = 10−187 that makes it negligible
even compared to the BSM rates being explored experimentally. (See Babu et al
(2013) for a recent review.)
Finally, among the multitude of current searches for BSM physics at the LHC to
which Eqn. 15 applies, I mention the example of the search for production a heavy
version of the Z0 boson (Section 8), a so-called Z′ (pronounced “Z-prime”). The Z′
would be the quantum of a new force that appears generically in many speculative
BSM models, but without any reliable prediction as to whether the mass or production
rate is accessible at the LHC. For these searches, 0 = 0 in the SM; σtot is determined
by the LHC beam energies, intensities, and the general-purpose detector’s measuring
capabilities; the scale τ is again rather arbitrary (as are pi0 and g), but much larger
than σtot.
In all three of these examples, the conditions of Eqn. 15 are met. Furthermore,
the three scales are largely independent. There can be a loose connection in that an
experiment may be designed with a particular subjective value of τ in mind, which
then influences how resources are allocated, if feasible, to obtain a value of σtot that
may settle a particular scientific issue. But this kind of connection can be tenuous in
HEP, especially when an existing general-purpose apparatus such as CMS or ATLAS
is applied to a new measurement. Therefore there is no generally applicable rule of
thumb relating τ to σtot.
Even if some sense of the scale τ can be specified, there still exists the arbitrariness
in choosing the form of g. Many experimenters in HEP think in terms of “orders of
magnitude”, with an implicit metric that is uniform in the log of the decay rate. For
example, some might say that “the experiment is worth doing if it extends the reach
by a factor of 10”, or that “it is worth taking data for another year if the number of
interactions observed is doubled”. But it is not at all clear that such phrasing really
corresponds to a belief that is uniform in the implicit logarithmic metric.
5.2 Test statistics for computing p-values in HEP
There is a long tradition in HEP of using likelihood ratios for both hypothesis testing
and estimation, following established frequentist theory (Stuart et al, 1999, Chapter
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22) such as the NP Lemma and Wilks’s Theorem. This is sometimes described in the
jargon of HEP (James, 1980), and other times with more extensive sourcing (Eadie
et al, 1971; Baker and Cousins, 1984; James, 2006; Cowan et al, 2011). When merited,
quite detailed likelihood functions (both binned and unbinned) are constructed. In
many cases, θ is a physically non-negative quantity (such as a mass or a Poisson
mean) that vanishes under the null hypothesis (θ0 = 0), and the alternative is H1:
θ > 0. The likelihood-ratio test statistic, denoted by λ, and its distribution under the
null hypothesis (see below) are used in a one-tailed test to obtain a p-value, which is
then converted to z, the equivalent number of standard deviations (σ) in a one-tailed
test of the mean of a normal distribution,
z = Φ−1(1− p) =
√
2 erf−1(1− 2p). (16)
For example, z = 3 corresponds to a p-value of 1.35 × 10−3, and z = 5 to a p-value
of 2.9× 10−7. (For upper confidence limits on θ, p-values are commonly modified to
mitigate some issues caused by downward fluctuations, but this does not affect the
procedure for testing H0.)
Nuisance parameters arising from detector calibration, estimates of background
rates, etc., are abundant in these analyses. A large part of the analysis effort is
devoted to understanding and validating the (often complicated) descriptions of the
response of the experimental apparatus that is included in λ. For nuisance parame-
ters, the uncertainties are typically listed as “systematic” in nature, the name that
elementary statistics books use for uncertainties that are not reduced with more sam-
pling. Nevertheless, some systematic uncertainties can be reduced as more data is
taken and used in the subsidiary analyses for calibrations.
A typical example is the calibration of the response of the detector to a high-energy
photon (γ), crucial for detecting the decay of the Higgs boson to two photons. The
basic detector response (an optical flash converted to an analog electrical pulse that is
digitized) must be converted to units of energy. The resulting energy “measurement”
suffers from a smearing due to resolution as well as errors in offset and scale. Special
calibration data and computer simulations are used to measure both the width and
shape of the smearing function, as well as to determine offsets and scales that still have
residual uncertainty. In terms of the simple N(θ, σ2tot) model discussed throughout
this paper, we have complications: the response function may not be normal but
can be measured; the bias on θ may not be zero but can be measured; and σtot is
also measured. All of the calibrations may change with temperature, position in
the detector, radiation damage, etc. Many resources are put into tracking the time-
evolution of calibration parameters, and therefore minimizing, but of course never
eliminating, the uncertainties.
Such calibration takes place for all the subdetectors used in a HEP experiment, for
all the basic types of detected particles (electrons, muons, pions, etc.). Ultimately,
with enough data, certain systematic uncertainties approach constant values that
limit the usefulness adding more data. (Example of limiting systematics would include
finite resolution on the time dependence of detector response; control of the lasers
used for calibration; magnetic field inhomogeneities not perfectly mapped; imperfect
material description in the detector simulation; and various theoretical uncertainties.)
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Once models for the nuisance parameters are selected, various approaches can be
used to “eliminate” them from the likelihood ratio λ (Cousins, 2005). “Profiling”
the nuisances parameters (i.e., re-optimizing the MLEs of the nuisance parameters
for each trial value of the parameter of interest) has been part of the basic HEP
software tools (though not called profiling) for decades (James, 1980). The results on
the Higgs boson at the LHC have been based on profiling, partly because asymptotic
formulas for profile likelihoods were generalized (Cowan et al, 2011) and found to be
useful. It is also common to integrate out (marginalize) nuisance parameters in λ
in a Bayesian fashion (typically using evidence-based priors), usually through Monte
Carlo integration (while treating the parameter of interest in a frequentist manner).
In many analyses, the result is fairly robust to the treatment of nuisance param-
eters in the definition of λ. For the separate step of obtaining the distribution of λ
under the null hypothesis, asymptotic theory (Cowan et al, 2011) can be applicable,
but when feasible the experimenters also perform Monte Carlo simulations of pseudo-
experiments. These simulations treat the nuisance parameters in some frequentist
and Bayesian-inspired ways, and are typically (though not always) rather insensitive
to the choice of method.
To the extent that integrations are performed over the nuisance parameters, or
that profiling yields similar results, the use of λ as a test statistic for a frequentist p-
value is reminiscent of Bayesian-frequentist hybrids in the statistics literature (Good,
1992, Section 1), including the prior-predictive p-value of Box (1980). Within HEP,
this mix of paradigms has been advocated (Cousins and Highland, 1992) as a prag-
matic approach, and found in general to yield reasonable results under a variety of
circumstances.
The complexity of such analyses is worth keeping in mind in Section 6, when the
concept of the “unit measurement” with σ =
√
nσtot is introduced as a basis for some
“objective” methods of setting the scale τ . The overall σtot is a synthesis of many
samplings of events of interest as well as events in the numerous calibration data sets
(some disjoint from the final analysis, some not). It is unclear what could be identified
as the number of events n, since the analysis does not fit neatly into the concept of n
identical samplings.
5.3 Are HEP experimenters biased against their null hy-
potheses?
Practitioners in disciplines outside of HEP are sometimes accused of being biased
against accepting null hypotheses, to the point that experiments are set up with the
sole purpose of rejecting the null hypothesis (Bayarri, 1987). Strong bias against
publishing null results (i.e., results that do not reject the null hypothesis) has been
described, for example, in psychology (Ferguson and Heene, 2012). Researchers might
feel the need to reject the null hypothesis in order to publish their results, etc. It is
unclear to what extent these characterizations might be valid in different fields, but
in HEP there is often significant prior belief in both the model and the point null
hypothesis (within 0). In many searches in HEP, there is a hope to reject the SM
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and make a major discovery of BSM physics in which the SM is nested. But there
is nonetheless high (or certainly non-negligible) prior belief in the null hypothesis.
There have been hundreds of experimental searches for BSM physics that have not
rejected the SM.
In HEP, it is normal to publish results that advance exploration of the frontiers
even if they do not reject the null hypothesis. The literature, including the most
prestigious journals, has many papers beginning with “Search for. . . ” that report no
significant evidence for the sought-for BSM physics. Often these publications provide
useful constraints on theoretical speculation, and offer guidance for future searches.
For physical quantities θ that cannot have negative values, the unbiased estimates
will be in the unphysical negative region about half of the time if the true value of
θ is small compared to σtot. It might appear that the measurement model is wrong
if half the results are unphysical. But the explanation in retrospect is that the null
hypotheses in HEP have tended to be true, or almost so. As no BSM physics has been
observed thus far at the LHC, the choices of experiments might be questioned, but
they are largely constrained by resources and by what nature has to offer for discovery.
Huge detector systems such as CMS and ATLAS are multipurpose experiments that
may not have the desired sensitivity to some specific processes of interest. Within
constraints of available resources and loosely prioritized as to speculation about where
the BSM physics may be observed, the collaborations try to look wherever there is
some capability for observing new phenomena.
5.4 Cases of an artificial null that carries little or no belief
As noted above, the “core physics models” used in our searches typically include
the SM as well as larger models in which the SM is embedded. In a typical search
for BSM physics, the SM is the null hypothesis and carries a non-negligible belief.
However, there does exist a class of searches for which physicists place little prior
belief on the null hypothesis, namely when the null hypothesis is the SM with a
missing piece! This occurs when experimenters are looking for the “first observation”
of a phenomenon that is predicted by the SM to have non-zero strength θ = θ1, but
which is yet to be confirmed in data. The null hypothesis is then typically defined
to be the simple hypothesis θ = θ0 = 0, i.e., everything in the SM except the as-yet-
confirmed phenomenon. While the alternative hypothesis could be taken to be the
simple hypothesis θ = θ1, it is more common to take the alternative to be θ > 0.
Results are then reported in two pieces: (i) a simple-vs-composite hypothesis test
that reports the p-value for the null hypothesis, and (ii) confidence interval(s) for
θ at one or more confidence level, which can be then compared to θ1. This gives
more flexibility in interpretation, including rejection of θ0 = 0, but with a surprising
value of θˆ that points to an alternative other than the SM value θ1. Furthermore
as in all searches, collaborations typically present plots showing the distribution of
z values obtained from Monte Carlo simulation of pseudo-experiments under each of
the hypotheses. From these plots one can read off the “expected z” (usually defined
as median) for each hypothesis, and also get a sense for how likely is a statistical
fluctuation to the observed z.
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An example from Fermilab is the search for production of single top quarks via
the weak force in proton-antiproton collisions (Abazov et al, 2009; Aaltonen et al,
2009; Fermilab, 2009). This search was performed after the weak force was clearly
characterized, and after top quarks were observed via their production in top-antitop
quark pairs by the strong force. The search for single top-quark production was
experimentally challenging, and the yields could have differed from expectations of
the SM due to the possibility of BSM physics. But there was not much credence in the
null hypothesis that production of single top quarks did not exist at all. Eventually
that null was rejected at more than 5σ. The interest remains on measured values
and particularly confidence intervals for the production rates (via more than one
mechanism), which thus far are consistent with SM expectations.
Another example is the search for a specific decay mode of the Bs particle that
contains a bottom quark (b) and anti-strange-quark (s). The SM predicts that a few
out of 109 Bs decays yield two muons (heavy versions of electrons) as decay products.
This measurement has significant potential for discovering BSM physics that might
enhance (or even reduce) the SM probability for this decay. The search used the
null hypothesis that the Bs decay to two muons had zero probability, a null that was
recently rejected at the 5σ level. As with single top-quark production, the true physics
interest was in the measured confidence interval(s), as there was negligible prior belief
in the artificial null hypothesis of exactly zero probability for this decay mode. Of
course, a prerequisite for measuring the small decay probability was high confidence
in the presence of this process in the analyzed data. Thus the clear observation
(rejection of the null) at high significance by each of two experiments was one of the
highlights of results from the LHC in 2013 (Chatrchyan et al, 2013a; Aaij et al, 2013;
CERN, 2013).
As the Higgs boson is an integral part of the SM (required for the renormalizability
of the SM) , the operational null hypothesis used in searching for it was similarly taken
to be an artificial model that included all of the SM except the Higgs boson, and which
had no BSM physics to replace the Higgs boson with a “Higgs-like” boson. However,
the attitude toward the hypotheses was not as simple as in the two previous examples.
The null hypothesis of having “no Higgs boson” carried some prior belief, in the
sense that it was perhaps plausible that BSM physics might mean that no SM Higgs
boson (or Higgs-like boson) was observable in the manner in which we were searching.
Furthermore, the search for the Higgs boson had such a long history, and had become
so well-known in the press, that there would have been a notable cost to a false
discovery claim. In my opinion, this was an important part of the justification for the
high threshold that the experimenters used for declaring an observation. (Section 9
discusses factors affecting the threshold.)
Analogous to the two previous examples, the implementation of the alternative
hypothesis was as the complete SM with a composite θ for the strength of the Higgs
boson signal. (This generalized alternative allowed for a “Higgs-like” boson that
perhaps could not be easily distinguished with data in hand.) However, the mass of
the Higgs boson is a free parameter in the SM, and had been only partially constrained
by previous measurements and theoretical arguments. Compared to the two previous
examples, this complicated the search significantly, as the probabilities of different
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decay modes of the Higgs boson change dramatically as a function of its mass.
This null hypothesis of no Higgs (or Higgs-like) boson was definitively rejected
upon the announcement of the observation of a new boson by both ATLAS and CMS
on July 4, 2012. The confidence intervals for signal strength θ in various decay sub-
classes, though not yet precise, were in reasonable agreement with the predictions
for the SM Higgs boson. Subsequently, much of the focus shifted to measurements
of describing different production and decay mechanisms. For measurements of con-
tinuous parameters, the null hypothesis has reverted to the complete SM with its
Higgs boson, and the tests (e.g., Chatrchyan et al (2014, Figure 22) and Aad et al
(2013, Figures 10-13)) use the frequentist duality (Section 9 below) between interval
estimation and hypothesis testing. One constructs (approximate) confidence inter-
vals and regions for parameters controlling various distributions, and checks whether
the predicted values for the SM Higgs boson are within the confidence regions. For
an important simple-vs-simple hypothesis test of the quantum mechanical property
called parity, p-values for both hypotheses were reported (Chatrchyan et al, 2013b),
as described in Section 2.2.
6 What sets the scale τ?
As discussed by Jeffreys (1961, p. 251) and re-emphasized by Bartlett (1957), defining
the scale τ (the range of values of θ over which the prior g(θ) is relatively large) is a
significant issue. Fundamentally, the scale appears to be personal and subjective, as
is the more detailed specification of g(θ). Berger and Delampady (1987a,b) state that
“the precise null testing situation is a prime example in which objective procedures do
not exist,” and “Testing a precise hypothesis is a situation in which there is clearly no
objective Bayesian analysis and, by implication, no sensible objective analysis what-
soever.” Nonetheless, as discussed in this section, Berger and others have attempted
to formulate principles for specifying default values of τ for communicating scientific
results.
Bartlett (1957) suggests that τ might scale as 1/
√
n, canceling the sample-size
scaling in σtot and making the Bayes factor independent of n. Cox (2006, p. 106)
suggests this as well, on the grounds that “. . . in most, if not all, specific applications
in which a test of such a hypothesis [θ = θ0] is thought worth doing, the only serious
possibilities needing consideration are that either the null hypothesis is (very nearly)
true or that some alternative within a range fairly close to θ0 is true.” This avoids
the situation that he finds unrealistic, in which “the corresponding answer depends
explicitly on n because, typically unrealistically, large portions of prior probability are
in regions remote from the null hypothesis relative to the information in the data.”
Part of Cox’s argument was already given by Jeffreys (1961, p. 251), “. . . the mere fact
that it has been suggested that [θ] is zero corresponds to some presumption that [θ] is
small.” Leamer (1978, p. 114) makes a similar point, “. . . a prior that allocates positive
probability to subspaces of the parameter space but is otherwise diffuse represents a
peculiar and unlikely blend of knowledge and ignorance”. (As Section 5.1 discusses,
this “peculiar and unlikely blend” is common in HEP.) Andrews (1994) also explores
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the consequences of τ shrinking with sample size, but these ideas seem not to have
led to a standard. As another possible reconciliation, Robert (1993) considers pi1 that
increases with τ , but this seems not to have been pursued further.
Many attempts in the Bayesian literature to specify a default τ arrive at a sug-
gestion that does not depend on n, and hence does not remove the dependence of
the Ockham factor on n. In the search for any non-subjective n-independent scale,
the only option seemingly at hand is σtot when n = 1, i.e., the original σ (Eqn. 1)
that expresses the uncertainty of a single measurement. This was in fact suggested
by Jeffreys (1961, p. 268), on the grounds that there is nothing else in the problem
that can set the scale, and was followed, for example, in generalizations by Zellner
and Siow (1980).
Kass and Wasserman (1995) do the same, which “has the interpretation of ‘the
amount of information in the prior on [θ] is equal to the amount of information about
[θ] contained in one observation’ ”. They refer to this as a “unit information prior”,
citing Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) as also using this “appealing interpretation of
the prior.” It is not clear to me why this “unit information” approach is “appealing”,
or how it could lead to useful, universally cross-calibrated Bayes factors in HEP. As
discussed in Section 5.2 the detector may also have some intrinsic σtot for which no
preferred n is evident. Raftery (1995a, pp. 132, 135) points out the same problem.
After defining a prior for which, “roughly speaking, the prior distribution contains
the same amount of information as would, on average, one observation”, he notes the
obvious problem in practice: the “important ambiguity. . . the definition of [n], the
sample size.” He gives several examples for which he has a recommendation.
Berger and Pericchi (2001, with commentary) review more general possibilities
based on use of the information in a small subset of the data, and for one method
claim that “this is the first general approach to the construction of conventional
priors in nested models.” Berger (2008, 2011) applied one of these so-called “intrinsic
priors” to a pedagogical example and its generalization from HEP. Unfortunately,
I am not aware of anyone in HEP who has pursued these suggestions. Meanwhile,
recently Bayarri, Berger, Forte, and Garca-Donato (2012) have reconsidered the issue
and formulated principles resulting “. . . in a new model selection objective prior with
a number of compelling properties.” I think that it is fair to conclude that this is still
an active area of research.
6.1 Comments on non-subjective priors for estimation and
model selection
For point and interval estimation, Jeffreys (1961) suggests two approaches for obtain-
ing a prior for a physically non-negative quantity such as the magnitude of the charge
q of the electron. Both involve invariance concepts. The first approach (pp. 120-
123) considers only the parameter being measured. In his example, one person might
consider the charge q to be the fundamental quantity, while another might consider
q2 (or some other power qm ) to be the fundamental quantity. In spite of this arbi-
trariness of the power m, everyone will arrive at consistent posterior densities if they
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each take the prior for qm to be 1/qm, since all expressions d(qm)/qm) differ only by
a proportionality constant. (Equivalently, they can all take the prior as uniform in
ln qm, i.e., in ln q.)
Jeffreys’s more famous second approach, leading to his eponymous rule and priors,
is based on the likelihood function and some averages over the sample space (i.e., over
possible observations). The likelihood function is based on what statisticians call the
measurement “model”. This means that “Jeffreys’s prior” is derived not by consid-
ering only the parameter being measured, but rather by examining the measuring
apparatus. For example, Jeffreys’s prior for a Gaussian (normal) measurement ap-
paratus is uniform in the measured value. If the measuring apparatus has Gaussian
response in q, the prior is uniform in q. If the measuring apparatus has Gaussian
response in q2, then the prior is uniform in q2. If the physical parameter is measured
with Gaussian resolution and is physically non-negative, as for the charge magnitude
q, then the functional form of the prior remains the same (uniform) and is set to zero
in the unphysical region (Berger, 1985, p. 89).
Berger and Bernardo refer to “non-subjective” priors such as Jeffreys’s prior as
“objective” priors. This strikes me as rather like referring to “non-cubical” volumes
as “spherical” volumes; one is changing the usual meaning to the word. Bernardo
(2011b) defends the use of “objective” as follows. “No statistical analysis is really
objective, since both the experimental design and the model assumed have very strong
subjective inputs. However, frequentist procedures are often branded as ‘objective’
just because their conclusions are only conditional on the model assumed and the
data obtained. Bayesian methods where the prior function is directly derived from
the assumed model are objective in this limited, but precise sense.”
Whether or not this defense is accepted, so-called “objective” priors can be deemed
useful for point and interval estimation, even to frequentists, as there is a deep (fre-
quentist) reason for their potential appeal. Because the priors are derived by using
knowledge of the properties of the measuring apparatus, it is at least conceivable
that Bayesian credible intervals based on them might have better-than-typical fre-
quentist coverage properties when interpreted as approximate frequentist confidence
intervals. As Welch and Peers (1963) showed, for Jeffreys’s priors this is indeed the
case for one-parameter problems. Under suitable regularity conditions, the approxi-
mate coverage of the resulting Bayesian credible intervals is uniquely good to order
1/n, compared to the slower convergence for other priors, which is good to order
1/
√
n. Hence, except at very small n, by using “objective” priors, one can (at least
approximately) obey the Likelihood Principle and obtain decent frequentist coverage,
which for some is a preferred “compromise”. Reasonable coverage can also be the
experience for Reference Priors with more than one parameter (Philippe and Robert,
1998, and references therein). This can happen even though objective priors are
improper (i.e., not normalizable) for many prototype problems; the ill-defined nor-
malization constant cancels out in the calculation of the posterior. (Equivalently, if
a cutoff parameter is introduced to make the prior proper, the dependence on the
cutoff vanishes as it increases without bound.)
For model selection, Jeffreys proposed a third approach to priors. As discussed in
Sections 2 and 3, from the point of view of the larger model, the prior is irregular,
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as it is described by a probability mass (a Dirac δ-function) on the null value θ0 that
has measure zero. The prior g(θ) on the rest of Θ must be normalizable (eliminating
improper priors used for estimation) in order for the posterior probability to be well-
defined. For Gaussian measurements, Jeffreys argued that g should be a Cauchy
density (“Breit-Wigner” in HEP).
Apart from the subtleties that led Jeffreys to choose the Cauchy form for g,
there is the major issue of the scale τ of g, as discussed in Section 6. The typical
assumption of “objective Bayesians” is that, basically by definition, an objective τ
is one that is derived from the measuring apparatus. And then, assuming that σ2tot
reflects n measurements using an apparatus that provides a variance for each of σ2,
as in Eqn. 1, they invoke σ as the scale of the prior g.
Lindley (e.g., in commenting on Bernardo (2011b)) argues in cases like this that
objective Bayesians can get lost in the Greek letters and lose contact with the actual
context. I too find it puzzling that one can first argue that the Ockham’s factor
is a crucial feature of Bayesian logic that is absent from frequentist reasoning, and
then resort to choosing this factor based on the measurement apparatus, and on a
concept of sample size n that can be difficult to identify. The textbook by Lee (2004,
p. 130) appears to agree that this is without compelling foundation: “Although it
seems reasonable that [τ ] should be chosen proportional to [σ], there does not seem
to be any convincing argument for choosing this to have any particular value. . . .”
It seems that, in order to be useful, any “objective” choice of τ must provide
demonstrable cross-calibration of experiments with different σtot when n is not well-
defined. Another voice emphasizing the practical nature of the problem is that of
Kass (2009), saying that Bayes factors for hypothesis testing “remain sensitive—to
first order—to the choice of the prior on the parameter being tested.” The results are
“contaminated by a constant that does not go away asymptotically.” He says that
this approach is “essentially nonexistent” in neuroscience.
7 The reference analysis approach of Bernardo
Bernardo (1999) (with critical discussion) defines Bayesian hypothesis testing in terms
very different from calculating the posterior probability of H0: θ = θ0. He proposes
to judge whether H0 is compatible (his italics) with the data:
“Any Bayesian solution to the problem posed will obviously require a prior distri-
bution p(θ) over Θ, and the result may well be very sensitive to the particular choice
of such prior; note that, in principle, there is no reason to assume that the prior
should necessarily be concentrated around a particular θ0; indeed, for a judgement on
the compatibility of a particular parameter value with the observed data to be use-
ful for scientific communication, this should only depend on the assumed model and
the observed data, and this requires some form of non-subjective prior specification
for θ which could be argued to be ‘neutral’; a sharply concentrated prior around a
particular θ0 would hardly qualify.” He later continues, “. . . nested hypothesis test-
ing problems are better described as specific decision problems about the choice of
a useful model and that, when formulated within the framework of decision theory,
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they do have a natural, fully Bayesian, coherent solution.”
Unlike Jeffreys, Bernardo advocates using the same non-subjective priors (even
when improper) for hypothesis testing as for point and interval estimation. He defines
a discrepancy measure d whose scaling properties can be complicated for small n,
but which asymptotically can be much more akin to those of p-values than to those
of Bayes factors. In fact, if the posterior becomes asymptotically normal, then d
approaches (1 + z2)/2 (Bernardo, 2011a,b). A fixed cutoff for his d (which he regards
as the objective approach), just as a fixed cutoff for z, is inconsistent in the statistical
sense, namely it does not accept H0 with probability 1 when H0 is true and the sample
size increases without bound.
Bernardo and Rueda (2002) elaborate this approach further, emphasizing that the
Bayes factor approach, when viewed from the framework of Bernardo’s formulation in
terms of decision theory, corresponds to a “zero-one” loss-difference function, which
they refer to as “simplistic”. (Loss functions are discussed by Berger (1985, Section
2.4).) The zero-one loss is so-named because the loss is zero if a correct decision is
made, and 1 if an incorrect decision is made. Berger states that, in practice, this
loss will rarely be a good approximation to the true loss.) Bernardo and Rueda
prefer continuous loss functions (such as quadratic loss) that do not require the use of
non-regular priors. A prior sharply spiked at θ0 “assumes important prior knowledge
. . . very strong prior beliefs,” and hence “Bayes factors should not be used to test
the compatibility of the data with H0, for they inextricably combine what the data
have to say with (typically subjective) strong beliefs about the value of θ.” This
contrasts with the commonly followed statement of Jeffreys (1961, p. 246) that (in
present notation), “To say that we have no information initially as to whether the
new parameter is needed or not we must take pi0 = pi1 = 1/2”. Bernardo and Rueda
reiterate Bernardo’s above-mentioned recommendation of applying the discrepancy
measure (expressed in “natural” units of information) according an absolute scale that
is independent of the specific problem.
Bernardo (2011b) provides a major review (with extensive commentary), referring
unapprovingly to point null hypotheses in an “objective” framework, and to the use
begun by Jeffreys of two “radically different” types of priors for estimation and for
hypothesis testing. He clarifies his view of hypothesis testing, that it is a decision
whether “to act as if H0 were true”, based on the expected posterior loss from using
the simpler model rather than the alternative (full model) in which it is nested.
In his rejoinder, Bernardo states that the JL paradox “clearly poses a very se-
rious problem to Bayes factors, in that, under certain conditions, they may lead to
misleading answers. Whether you call this a paradox or a disagreement, the fact
that the Bayes factor for the null may be arbitrarily large for sufficiently large n,
however relatively unlikely the data may be under H0 is, to say the least, deeply dis-
turbing. . . the Bayes factor analysis may be completely misleading, in that it would
suggest accepting the null, even if the likelihood ratio for the MLE against the null is
very large.”
At a recent PhyStat workshop where Bernardo (2011a) summarized this approach,
physicist Demortier (2011) considered it appropriate when the point null hypothesis
is a useful simplification (in the sense of definitions in decision theory) rather a point
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having significant prior probability. He noted (as did Bernardo) that the formalism
can account for point nulls if this is desired.
8 Effect size in HEP
As noted in the introduction, in this paper “effect size” refers to the point and interval
estimates (measured values and uncertainties) of a parameter or physical quantity,
typically expressed in the original units. Apparently, reporting of effect sizes is not
always automatic in some disciplines, leading to repeated reminders to report them
(Kirk, 1996; Wilkinson et al, 1999; Nakagawa and Cuthill, 2007; APA, 2010). In HEP,
however, point estimates and confidence intervals for model parameters are used to
summarize the results of nearly all experiments, and to compare to the predictions of
theory (which often have uncertainties as well).
For experiments in which one particle interacts with another, the meeting point for
comparison of theory and experiment is frequently an interaction probability referred
to as a “cross section”. For particles produced in interactions and that subsequently
decay (into other particles), the comparison of theory and experiment typically in-
volves the decay rate (probability of decay per second) or its inverse, the mean lifetime.
Measurements of cross sections and decay rates can be subdivided into distinguishable
subprocesses, as functions of both continuous parameters (such as production angles)
and discrete parameters (such as the probabilities known as “branching fractions” for
decay into different sets of decay products).
In the example of the Higgs boson discovery, the effect size was quantified through
confidence intervals on the product of cross sections and the branching fractions
for different sets of decay products. These confidence intervals provided exciting
indications that the new boson was indeed “Higgs-like”, as described by Incandela
and Gianotti and the subsequent ATLAS and CMS publications (Aad et al, 2012;
Chatrchyan et al, 2012). By spring 2013, more data had been analyzed and it seemed
clear to both collaborations that the boson was “a” Higgs boson (leaving open the
possibility that there might be more than one). Some of the key figures are described
in the information accompanying the announcement of the 2013 Nobel Prize in Physics
(Swedish Academy, 2013, Figures 6 and 7).
8.1 No effect size is too small in core physics models
If one takes the point of view that “all models are wrong” (Box, 1976), then a tiny
departure from the null hypothesis for a parameter in a normal model, which is
conditional on the model being true, might be properly disregarded as uninteresting.
Even if the model is true, a small p-value might be associated with a departure from
the null hypothesis (effect size) that is too small to have practical significance in
formulating public policy or decision-making. In contrast, core physics models reflect
presumed “laws of nature”, and it is always of major interest if departures with any
effect size can be established with high confidence.
In HEP, tests of core physics models also benefit from what we believe to be the
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world’s most perfect random-sampling mechanism, namely quantum mechanics. In
each of many repetitions of a given initial state, nature randomly picks out a final
state according to the weights given by the (true, but not completely known) laws
of physics and quantum mechanics. Furthermore, the most perfect incarnation of
“identical” is achieved through the fundamental quantum-mechanical property that
elementary particles of the same type are indistinguishable. The underlying statistical
model is typically binomial or its generalizations and approximations, especially the
Poisson distribution.
8.2 Small effect size can indicate new phenomena at higher
energy
For every force there is a quantum field that permeates all space. As suggested in
1905 by Einstein for the electromagnetic (EM) field, associated with every quantum
field is an “energy quantum” (called the photon for the EM field) that is absorbed
or emitted (“exchanged”) by other particles interacting via that field. While the
mass of the photon is presumed to be exactly zero, the masses of quanta of some
other fields are non-zero. The nominal mass m, energy E, and momentum p of such
energy quanta are related through Einstein’s equation, m2 = E2 − p2. (For unstable
particles, the definition of the nominal mass is somewhat technical, but there are
agreed-on conventions.)
Interactions in modern physics are possible because energy quanta can be ex-
changed even when the energy ∆E and momentum ∆p being transferred in the inter-
action do not correspond to the nominal mass of the exchanged quantum. With
a quantity q2 (unrelated to symbol for the charge q of the electron) defined by
q2 = (∆E)2 − (∆p)2, quantum mechanics reduces the probability of the reaction
as q2 departs from the true m2 of the exchanged particle. In many processes, the
reduction factor is at leading order proportional to
1
(m2 − q2)2 . (17)
(As q2 can be positive or negative, the relative sign of q2 and m2 depends on details
of the process. For positive q2, the singularity of m2 = q2 is made finite by another
term that can be otherwise neglected in the present discussion.) What q2 is accessi-
ble depends on the available technology; in general, larger q2 requires higher-energy
particle beams and therefore more costly accelerators.
For the photon, m = 0, and the interaction probability goes as 1/q4. On the other
hand, if the mass m of the quantum of a force is so large that m2  |q2|, then the
probability for an interaction to occur due to the exchange of such a quantum is pro-
portional to 1/m4. By looking for interactions or decays having very low probability,
it is possible to probe the existence of massive quanta with m2 well beyond those that
can be created with concurrent technology.
An illustrative example, studied by Galison (1983), is the accumulation of evidence
for the Z0 boson (with mass mZ), an electrically neutral quantum of the weak force
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hypothesized in the 1960s. Experiments were performed in the late 1960s and early
1970s using intense beams of neutrinos scattering off targets of ordinary matter. The
available |q2| was much smaller than m2Z, resulting in a small reaction probability
in the presence of other processes that obscured the signal. CERN staked the initial
claim for observation (Hasert et al, 1973). After a period of confusion, both CERN and
Fermilab experimental teams agreed that they had observed interactions mediated by
Z0 bosons, even though no Z0 bosons were detected directly, as the energies involved
(and hence
√|q2|) were well below mZ.
In another type of experiment probing the Z0 boson, conducted at SLAC in the late
1970s (Prescott et al, 1978), specially prepared electrons (“spin polarized electrons” in
physics jargon) were scattered off nuclei to seek a very subtle left-right asymmetry in
the scattered electrons arising from the combined action of electromagnetic and weak
forces. In an exquisite experiment, an asymmetry of about 1 part in 104 was measured
to about 10% statistical precision with an estimated systematic uncertainty also about
10%. The statistical model was binomial, and the experiment had the ability to
measure departures from unity of twice the binomial parameter with an uncertainty
of about 10−5. I.e., the sample size of scattered electrons was of order 1010. This
precision in a binomial parameter is finer than that in an ESP example that has
generated lively discussion in the statistics literature on the JL paradox (Bernardo,
2011b, pp. 19, 26, and cited references, and comments and rejoinder). More recent
experiments measure this scattering asymmetry even more precisely. The results of
Prescott et al. confirmed predictions of the model of electroweak interactions put
forward by Glashow, Weinberg, and Salam, clearing the way for their Nobel Prize in
1979.
Finally, in 1982, the technology for creating interactions with q2 = m2Z was realized
at CERN through collisions of high energy protons and antiprotons (and subsequently
at Fermilab). And in 1989, “Z0 factories” turned on at SLAC and CERN, colliding
electrons and positrons at beam energies tuned to q2 = m2Z. At this q
2, the small de-
nominator in Eqn. 17 causes the tiny deviation in the previous experiments to become
a huge increase in the interaction probability, a factor of 1000 increase compared to
the null hypothesis of “no Z0 boson”. (There is an additional term in the denomina-
tor of Eqn. 17 that reflects the instability of the Z0 boson to decay and that I have
neglected thus far; at q2 = m2Z, it keeps the expression finite.)
This sequence of events in the experimental pursuit of the Z0 boson is somewhat
of a prototype for what many in HEP hope will happen again. A given process
(scattering or decay) has rate zero (or immeasurably small 0) according to the SM.
If, however, there is a new boson X with mass mX much higher than accessible with
current technology, then the boson may give a non-zero rate, proportional to 1/m4X ,
for the given process. The null hypothesis is that X does not exist and the rate for
the process is immeasurably small. As mX is not known, the possible rates for the
process if X does exist comprise a continuum, including rates arbitrarily close to zero.
But these tiny numbers in the continuum map onto possibilities for major, discrete,
modifications to the laws of nature—new forces!
The searches for rare decays described in Section 5.1 are examples of this approach.
For rare decays of K0L particles, an observation of a branching fraction at the 10
−11
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level would have indicated the presence of a new mass scale some 1000 times greater
than the mass of the Z0 boson, which is more than a factor of 10 above currently
accessible q2 values at LHC. Such mass scales are also probed by measuring the
difference between the mass of the K0L and that of closely related particle, the short-
lived neutral kaon (K0S). The mass of the K
0
L is about half the mass of the proton,
and has been measured to a part in 104. The K0L − K0S mass difference has been
measured to a part in 1014, far more precisely than the mass itself. The difference
arises from higher-order terms in the weak interaction, and is extremely sensitive to
certain classes of speculative BSM physics. Even more impressively, the observation
of proton decay with a decay rate at the level probed by current experiments would
spectacularly indicate a new mass scale a factor of 1013 greater than that of the mass
of the Z0 boson.
Alas, none of these experiments has observed processes that would indicate BSM
physics. In the intervening years, there have however been major discoveries in neu-
trino physics that have redefined and extended the SM. These discoveries established
that the mass of the neutrino, while tiny, is not zero. In some physics models called
“seesaw models”, the neutrino mass is inversely proportional to a mass scale of BSM
physics; thus one interpretation is that the tiny neutrino masses indicate a new very
large mass scale, perhaps approaching the scale probed by proton decay (Hirsch et al,
2013).
9 Neyman-Pearson testing and the choice of
Type I error probability α
In Neyman-Pearson (NP) hypothesis testing, the Type I error α is the probability
of rejecting H0 when it is true. For testing a point null vs a composite alternative,
there is a duality between NP hypothesis testing and frequentist interval estimation
via confidence intervals. The hypothesis test for H0: θ = θ0 vs H1: θ 6= θ0, at
significance level (“size”) α, is entirely equivalent to whether θ0 is contained in a
confidence interval for θ with confidence level (CL) of 1 − α. As emphasized by
Stuart, Ord, and Arnold (1999, p. 175), “Thus there is no need to derive optimal
properties separately for tests and intervals: there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the problems. . . .”
Mayo and Spanos (2006) argue that confidence intervals have shortcomings that
are avoided by using Mayo’s concept of “severe testing”. Spanos (2013) argues this
specifically in the context of the JL paradox. I am not aware of widespread application
of the severe testing approach, and do not yet understand it well enough to see how it
would improve scientific communication in HEP if adopted. Hence the present paper
focuses on the traditional frequentist methods.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, in HEP the workhorse test statistic for testing and
estimation is often a likelihood-ratio λ. In practice, sometimes one first performs
the hypothesis test and uses the duality to “invert the test” to obtain confidence
intervals, and sometimes one first finds intervals. Performing the test and inverting it
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in a rigorous manner is equivalent to the original “Neyman construction” of confidence
intervals (Neyman, 1937). Such a construction using the likelihood-ratio test statistic
has been advocated by Feldman and Cousins (1998), particularly in irregular problems
such as when the null hypothesis is on the boundary. In more routine applications,
approximate confidence intervals or regions can be obtained by finding maximum-
likelihood estimates of unknown parameters and forming regions bounded by contours
of differences in lnλ as in Wilks’s Theorem (James, 1980, 2006).
Confidence intervals in HEP are typically presented for conventional confidence
levels (68%, 90%, 95%, etc.). Alternatively, when experimenters report a p-value
with respect to some null value, anyone can invoke the NP accept/reject paradigm
by comparing the reported p-value to one’s own (previously chosen) value of α. From
a mathematical point of view, one can define the post-data p-value as the smallest
significance level α at which the null hypothesis would be rejected, had that α been
specified in advance (Rice, 2007, p. 335). This may offend some who point out that
Fisher did not define the p-value this way when he introduced the term, but these
protests do not negate the numerical identity with Fisher’s p-value, even when the
different interpretations are kept distinct.
Regardless of the steps through which one learns whether the test statistic λ is in
the rejection region of a particular value of θ, one must choose the size α, the Type I
error probability of rejecting H0 when it is true. Neyman and Pearson introduced the
alternative hypothesis H1 and the Type II error β for the probability under H1 that
H0 is not rejected when it is false. They remarked, (Neyman and Pearson, 1933a,
p. 296) “These two sources of error can rarely be eliminated completely; in some
cases it will be more important to avoid the first, in others the second. . . . The use of
these statistical tools in any given case, in determining just how the balance should
be struck, must be left to the investigator.”
Lehmann and Romero (2005, p. 57, and earlier editions by Lehmann) echo this
point in terms of the power of the test, defined as 1−β: “The choice of a level of signif-
icance α is usually somewhat arbitrary. . . the choice should also take in consideration
the power that the test will achieve against the alternatives of interest. . . .”
For simple-vs-simple hypothesis tests discussed in Section 2.2, the power 1−β is
well-defined, and, in fact, Neyman and Pearson (1933b, p. 497) discuss how to balance
the two types of error, for example by considering their sum. It is well-known today
that such an approach, including minimizing a weighted sum, can remove some of the
unpleasant aspects of testing with a fixed α, such as inconsistency in the statistical
sense (as mentioned in Section 7, not accepting H0 with probability 1 when H0 is
true and the sample size increases without bound).
But this optimization of the tradeoff between α and β becomes ill-defined for a
test of simple vs composite hypotheses when the composite hypothesis has values of θ
arbitrarily close to θ0, since the limiting value of β is 0.5, independent of α (Neyman
and Pearson, 1933b, p. 496). Robert (2013) echoes this concern that in NP testing,
“there is a fundamental difficulty in finding a proper balance (or imbalance) between
Type I and Type II errors, since such balance is not provided by the theory, which
settles for the sub-optimal selection of a fixed Type I error. In addition, the whole
notion of power, while central to this referential, has arguable foundations in that
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this is a function that inevitably depends on the unknown parameter θ. In particular,
the power decreases to the Type I error at the boundary between the null and the
alternative hypotheses in the parameter set.”
Unless a value of θ in the composite hypothesis is of sufficiently special interest
to justify its use for considering power, there is no clear procedure. A Bayesian-
inspired approach would allow optimization by weighting the values of θ under H1
by a prior g(θ). As Raftery (1995a, p. 142) notes, “Bayes factors can be viewed as a
precise way of implementing the advice of [Neyman and Pearson (1933a)] that power
and significance be balanced when setting the significance level. . . there is a conflict
between Bayes factors and significance testing at predetermined levels such as .05 or
.01.” In fact, Neyman and Pearson (1933b, p. 502) suggest this possibility if multiple
θi under the alternative hypothesis are genuinely sampled from known probabilities
Φi: “. . . if the Φi’s were known, a test of greater resultant power could almost certainly
be found.”
Kendall and Stuart and successors (Stuart, Ord, and Arnold, 1999, Section 20.29)
view the choice of α in terms of costs: “. . . unless we have supplemental information
in the form of the costs (in money or other common terms) of the two types of error,
and costs of observations, we cannot obtain an optimal combination of α, β, and n for
any given problem.” But prior belief should also play a role, as remarked by Lehmann
and Romero (2005, p. 58) (and earlier editions by Lehmann): “Another consideration
that may enter into the specification of a significance level is the attitude toward the
hypothesis before the experiment is performed. If one firmly believes the hypothesis
to be true, extremely convincing evidence will be required before one is willing to give
up this belief, and the significance level will accordingly be set very low.”
Of course, these vague statements about choosing α do not come close to a formal
decision theory (which is however not visibly practiced in HEP). For the case of simple
vs composite hypotheses relevant to the JL paradox, HEP physicists informally take
into account prior belief, the measured values of θ and its confidence interval, as well
as relative costs of errors, contrary to myths about automatic use of a “5σ” criterion
discussed in the next section.
9.1 The mythology of 5σ
Nowadays it is commonly written that 5σ is the criterion for a discovery in HEP. Such
a fixed one-size-fits-all level of significance ignores the consideration noted above by
Lehmann, and violates one of the most commonly stated tenets of science—that the
more extraordinary the claim, the more extraordinary must be the evidence. I do not
believe that experienced physicists have such an automatic response to a p-value, but
it may be that some people in the field may take the fixed threshold more seriously
than is warranted.
The (quite sensible) historical roots of the 5σ criterion were in a specific context,
namely searches performed in the 1960s for new “elementary particles”, now known
to be composite particles with different configurations of quarks in their substruc-
ture. A plethora of histograms were made, and presumed new particles, known as
“resonances” showed up as localized excesses (“bumps”) spanning several histogram
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bins. Upon finding an excess and defining those bins as the “signal region”, the “local
p-value” could be calculated as follows. First the nearby bins in the histogram (“side-
bands”) were used to formulate the null hypothesis corresponding to the expected
number of events in the signal region in the absence of a new particle. Then the
(Poisson) probability under the null hypothesis of observing a bump as large as or
larger than that seen was calculated, and expressed in terms of standard deviations
“σ” by analogy to a one-sided test of a normal distribution.
The problem was that the location of a new resonance was typically not known
in advance, and the local p-value did not include the fact that “pure chance” had
lots of opportunities (lots of histograms and many bins) to provide an unlikely oc-
currence. Over time many of the alleged new resonances were not confirmed in other
independent experiments. In the group led by Alvarez at Berkeley, histograms with
putative new resonances were compared to simulations drawn from smooth distribu-
tions (Alvarez, 1968). Rosenfeld (1968, p. 465) describes such simulations and rough
hand calculations of the number of trials, and concludes, “To the theorist or phe-
nomenologist the moral is simple: wait for nearly 5σ effects. For the experimental
group who have spent a year of their time and perhaps a million dollars, the problem
is harder. . . go ahead and publish. . . but they should realize that any bump less than
about 5σ calls only for a repeat of the experiment.”
The original concept of “5σ” in HEP was therefore mainly motivated as a (fairly
crude) way to account for a multiple trials factor (MTF, Section 9.2) in searches for
phenomena poorly specified in advance. However, the threshold had at least one other
likely motivation, namely that in retrospect spurious resonances often were attributed
to mistakes in modeling the detector or other so-called “systematic effects” that were
either unknown or not properly taken into account. The “5σ” threshold provides
crude protection against such mistakes.
Unfortunately, many current HEP practitioners are unaware of the original moti-
vation for “5σ”, and some may apply this rule without much thought. For example, it
is sometimes used as a threshold when an MTF correction (Section 9.2) has already
been applied, or when there is no MTF from multiple bins or histograms because
the measurement corresponds to a completely specified location in parameter space,
aside from the value of θ in the composite hypothesis. In this case, there is still the
question of how many measurements of other quantities to include in the number of
trials (Lyons, 2010). Further thoughts on 5σ are given in a recent note by Lyons
(2013).
9.2 Multiple trials factors for scanning nuisance parameters
that are not eliminated
The situation with the MTF described in the previous section can arise whenever
there is nuisance parameter ψ that the analysts choose not to eliminate, but instead
choose to communicate the results (p-value and confidence interval for θ) as a function
of ψ. The search for the Higgs boson (Aad et al, 2012; Chatrchyan et al, 2012) is such
an example, where ψ is the mass of the boson, while θ is the Poisson mean (relative
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to that expected for the SM Higgs boson) of any putative excess of events at mass
ψ. For each mass ψ there is a p-value for the departure from H0, as if that mass
had been fixed in advance, as well as a confidence interval for θ, given that ψ. This
p-value is the “local” p-value, the probability for a deviation at least as extreme as
that observed, at that particular mass. (Local p-values are correlated with those at
nearby masses due to experimental resolution of the mass measurement.)
One can then scan all masses in a specified range and find the smallest local p-
value, pmin. The probability of having a local p-value as small or smaller than pmin,
anywhere in a specified mass range, is greater than pmin, by a factor that is effectively
a MTF (also known as the “Look Elsewhere Effect” in HEP). When feasible, the
LHC experiments use Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the p-value that takes
this MTF into account, and refer to that as a “global” p-value for the specified mass
range. When this is too computationally demanding, they estimate the global p-value
using the method advocated by Gross and Vitells (2010), which is based on that of
Davies (1987).
To emphasize that the range of masses used for this effective MTF is arbitrary or
subjective, and to indicate the sensitivity to the range, the LHC collaborations chose
to give the global p-value for two ranges of mass (Aad et al (2012, pp. 11,14) and
Chatrchyan et al (2012, pp. 33,41)). Some possibilities were the range of masses for
which the SM Higgs boson was not previously ruled out at high confidence; the range
of masses for which the experiment is capable of observing the SM Higgs boson; or
the range of masses for which sufficient data had been acquired to search for any new
boson. The collaborations made different choices.
10 Can results of hypothesis tests be cross-calibrated
among different searches?
In communicating the results of an experiment, generally the goal is to describe
the methods, data analysis, and results, as well as the authors’ interpretations and
conclusions, in a manner that enables readers to draw their own conclusions. Although
at times authors provide a description of the likelihood function for their observations,
it is common to assume that confidence intervals (often given for more than one
confidence level) and p-values (frequently expressed as equivalent z of Eqn. 16) are
sufficient input into inferences or decisions to be made by readers.
It can therefore be asked what is the result of an author (or reader) taking the
p-value as the “observed data” for a full (subjective) Bayesian calculation of the
posterior probability of H0. One could even attempt to go further and formulate
a decision on whether to claim publicly that H0 is false, using a (subjective) loss
function describing one’s personal costs of falsely declaring a discovery, compared to
not declaring a true discovery.
From Eqn. 10, clearly z alone is not sufficient to recover the Bayes factor and
proceed as a Bayesian. This point is repeatedly emphasized in articles already cited.
(Even worse is to try to recover the BF using only the binary inputs as to whether the
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p-value was above some fixed thresholds (Dickey, 1977; Berger and Mortera, 1991;
Johnstone and Lindley, 1995).) The oft-repeated argument (e.g., Raftery (1995a,
p. 143)) is that there is no justification for the step in the derivation of the p-value
where “probability density for data as extreme as that observed” is replaced with
“probability for data as extreme, or more extreme”. Jeffreys (1961, p. 385) still
seems to be unsurpassed in his ironic way of saying this (italics in original), “What
the use of [the p-value] implies, therefore, is that a hypothesis that may be true may
be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred.”
Good (1992) opined that, “The real objection to [p-values] is not that they usually
are utter nonsense, but rather that they can be highly misleading, especially if the
value of [n] is not also taken into account and is large.” He suggested a rule of thumb
for taking n into account by standardizing the p-value to an effective size of n = 100,
but this seems not to have attracted a following.
Meanwhile, often a confidence interval for θ (as invariably reported in HEP pub-
lications for 68% CL and at times for other values) does give a good sense of the
magnitude of σtot (although this might be misleading in certain special cases). And
one has a subjective prior and therefore its scale τ . Thus, at least crudely, the required
inputs are in hand to recover the result from something like Eqn. 10. It is perhaps
doubtful that most physicists would use them to arrive at the same Ockham factor
as calculated through a BF from the original likelihood function. On the other hand,
a BF based on an arbitrary (“objective”) τ does not seem to be an obviously better
way to communicate a result.
While the “5σ” criterion in HEP gets a lot of press, I think that when a decision
needs to be made, physicists intuitively and informally adjust their decision-making
based on the p-value, the confidence interval, their prior belief in H0 and g(θ), and
their personal sense of costs and risks.
11 Summary and Conclusions
More than a half century after Lindley drew attention to the different dependence
of p-values and Bayes factors on sample size n (described two decades previously by
Jeffreys), there is still no consensus on how best to communicate results of testing
scientific hypotheses. The argument continues, especially within the broader Bayesian
community, where there is much criticism of p-values, and praise for the “logical”
approach of Bayes factors. A core issue for scientific communication is that the
Ockham factor σtot/τ is either arbitrary or personal, even asymptotically for large n.
It has always been important in Bayesian point and interval estimation for the
analyst to describe the sensitivity of results to choices of prior probability, especially
for problems involving many parameters. In testing hypotheses, such sensitivity anal-
ysis is clearly mandatory. The issue is not really the difference in numerical value of
p-values and posterior probabilities (or Bayes factors) as one must commit the error
of transposing the conditional probability (fallacy of probability inversion) to equate
the two. Rather, the fundamental question is whether a summary of the experimental
results, with say two or three numbers, can (even in principle) be interpreted in a
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manner cross-calibrated across different experiments. The difference in scaling with
sample size (or more generally, the difference in scaling with σtot/τ) of the BF and
likelihood ratio λ is already apparent in Eqn. 14; therefore the additional issue of
tail probabilities of data not observed, pithily derided by Jeffreys (Section 10 above),
cannot bear all the blame for the paradox.
It is important to gain more experience in HEP with Bayes factors, and also with
Bernardo’s intriguing proposals. For statisticians, I hope that this discussion of the
issues in HEP provides “existence proofs” of situations where we cannot ignore the JL
paradox, and renews some attempts to improve methods of scientific communication.
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